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INHERENT IMPROPRIETIES IN THE INCOME
TAX AMENDMENT TO THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION
This may seem a rather formidable and imposing title to some
readers. But I simply wish to convey the idea that there are
certain fundamental improprieties, inconsistent with our Repub-
lican institutions and with the dual form of our government,
which render an adoption of the income tax amendment to the
federal 'Constitution a serious innovation. Constitutional, of
course, it will be because everything is constitutional which that
instrument permits; but such an amendment will certainly involve
a grave impropriety.
It is purposed to change the United States Constitution by add-
ing thereto the following, as the sixteenth amendment, which
shall read:
"Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on in-
comes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States or without regard to any census or
enumeration."
The federal government now has power to tax incomes; but
as the Supreme Court has construed that clause of section 8 of
the Constitution, which reads: "No capitation or other direct
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration
hereinbefore directed to be taken," to include an income tax;
therefore, it follows that the general government can now collect
such a tax only by apportioning the amount of the same among
the several states according to population.
I apprehend'that to the majority of the people of this country
the question as to whether the federal government should adopt
the income tax is largely an economic and practical one. The
fundamental legal aspects have not received serious enough con-
sideration. If the income tax is economically wise and sound, and
if it is practicable to collect it, equitably and honestly, from the
persons on whom it is imposed, probably the majority will reply,
assuredly the general government at Washington should have this
power to levy and collect an income tax throughout the country.
But quite apart from the wisdom and soundness of such a
tax in theory, owing to the peculiar nature of our institutions,
and judging from the limitations with which the powers of the
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general government have been surrounded, the nation's founders
who framed that matchless code of law, the United States Consti-
tution, never intended that the federal government should exer-
cise the unqualified power to levy an income tax. We should be
careful to distinguish at the outset between an income tax im-
posed by the State government and such a tax levied by the
general government at Washington. As to the former there can
be no objection or criticism whatever, so far as the constitutional
proprieties are concerned; but it is against the latter that the limita-
tions of a government of enumerated powers so seriously militate.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE INCOME TAX.
It is quite unnecessary for us to discuss at length the question
whether the income tax is a direct tax. That question can no
longer be considered open. It was solemnly adjudicated in the
famous case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company'
in 1895, and, of course, the very proposal of an amendment to
the United States Constitution, giving Congress power to impose
an income tax without apportionment is itself an admission that
the term "direct taxes" includes an income tax. But, on the
other hand, owing to the fact that the Supreme Court has been,
by some, seriously criticised in its decision, it is well and proper
to devote some consideration to that question. Indeed, a part
of the agitation in favor of an amendment to the Constitution
grows out of the charge that the Supreme Court, in deciding the
Pollock case, "changed its mind" (so the critics say), reversed
all prior decisions and erred in its judgment. That the Supreme
Court reversed a prior judgment must be admitted, but the re-
mainder of the charge against this high tribunal is wholly with-
out justice. It may be briefly said that, as one reads to-day the
arguments of the learned counsel and the opinions of the justices
in that case, freed from the disappointment which influenced some
1 157 U. S., 429; affirmed on rehearing before a full bench, 158 U. S.,
565 (four justices dissenting, but only on the point of income derived
from personal property.) It is very plain as one reads through the
elaborate dissenting opinions of Justices White and Harlan in the
Pollock case that the main basis for their judgment is the principle of
stare decisis. On the same principle, also, are based the expressions of
opinion of some of our jurists and constitutional writers, such as Kent,
Story, Pomeroy and Ordronaux. The restrictive definition which they
give to the term "direct tax" is based almost exclusively on the unfor-
tunate dicta of the justices in the Hylton case.
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minds at the time, there never ought to have been any question, it
would seem, as to whether a general income tax is a direct tax.
An earlier case in which the Supreme Court decided flatly that
a tax against the citizen in respect of his general income, was an
indirect tax, is Springer v. United States.2 The Supreme Court
in this case was led into the error of declaring that an income tax
was not a direct tax because influenced by the dicta and expres-
sions of opinion of the justices in the very early case of Hylton
v. United States.3  A great deal of error and misunderstanding
has surrounded the actual adjudication of the court in the Hylton
case which was confined solely to the point that a tax on car-
riages of the nature provided for in that act was an indirect tax.
That case did not involve any adjudication as to the nature of an
income tax.4 It may be that the carriage tax in the Hylton case
was an indirect tax, because it was a tax upon consumption, and
in its ultimate incidence fell upon the consumer or user of the
carriage, and not necessarily upon the owner. In the case of
Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule5 the tax was levied against
the income of insurance companies derived in part from pre-
miums on policies; manifestly, this was also an indirect tax be-
cause it fell ultimately, not upon the insurance company, but
upon the policyholder, whose premium was proportionately in-
creased by the amount of the tax levied. It would seem, there-
fore, that in its earlier adjudications, the Supreme Court erred
in failing to distinguish between the different kinds of income
2 102 U. S., 586.
33 Dallas, 171. The expressions of personal opinion by Justices
Chase and Paterson in the Hylton case, though erroneously followed by
the Supreme Court in subsequent years, are not in accord with Hamil-
ton's opinion as expressed in his brief in behalf of the United States in
that case, and he must be regarded as perhaps the most eminent authority
on the subject at that time. See Works of Hamilton, Vol. VII, 845. In
this connection see George Ticknor Curtis in "Revenue Powers of the
United States," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, Vol. XXXIII, 354, 362.
4 For example, see the inaccuracy and confusion of language em-
ployed by Senator Root in his open letter to Hon. F. M. Davenport,
member of the New York State Senate, advocating the proposed amend-
ment, published in Congressional Record, March i, 191o, Vol. XLV, 2564.
Governor Fort's message to the New Jersey Legislature of February 16,
igio, on the Income Tax contains a very palpable error on this point.
See also the glaring misstatement in Senator Brown's article in the
Outlook of January 22, 1910, Vol. 94, No. 4, entitled "The Income Tax
Amendment."
5 7 Wall., 433.
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taxes. Practically, it is not every kind of income tax which is
a direct tax. The term "income tax" has been too generally and
broadly used to cover a variety of taxes imposed on persons
and property which may ultimately be payable out of income.
There are several instances of taxes of this nature seen in the
fiscal history of our own colonies, and of France and England, in
which the tax levied really against the property itself has been
made payable out of the income, or the amount of the assessment
has been measured by the income, and such a tax has been er-
roneously denominated an income tax. Other illustrations are,
perhaps, the "faculty tax" and the partial tax on profits of old
colonial days.8 Some of the taxes imposed under the internal
revenue provisions of our Civil War, while payable out of in-
come or revenue, were not properly income taxes, as, for instance,
the tax on premium receipts of insurance companies, and possi-
bly that on bank profits and undivided surplus. But the income
tax levied against the general income of the citizen is of a very
different nature. It is distinctly a personal tax and undoubtedly
a direct tax; in fact, it is difficult to conceive of a tax more direct
or personal in its nature than the general income taxT
It may be said in defense of the earlier decisions of the
Supreme Court, regarding income taxes, that as the question is
not at all a simple one, but surrounded with a great many eco-
nomic perplexities, the failure to distinguish between the general
income tax levied against the person and an excise tax levied
against specific sources of revenue, or against property or busi-
ness, but payable out of income, is not surprising. Very likely
it required just such an important case, involving the imposition
of a general income tax, fraught with great consequences and
freed from the influences and emotions of the Civil War, as was
6 See Prof. Edwin R. A. Seligman's article in Political Science Quar-
terly, Vol X, 221. "By an income tax we mean a tax upon the personal
income of the individual. It is a personal tax, not a tax on things, not
a real tax. * * * The new and more general taxes" (on a person's
income) "are direct income taxes, and have the characteristics of a per-
sonal, not a real, tax." pp. 244 and 246, Pol. Sci. Quar., X. But popu-
larly, I apprehend that the "faculty tax" of the Colonies was regarded
by the men of that day as much a direct tax as a general income tax was.
7 See "Theory and Practice of Taxation," by David A. Wells, LL. D.,
(New York, 1900), pp. 547, 548. "Revenue Powers of the United States,"
Harper's Magazine, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 354, 355, by George Ticknor
Curtis. See, also, brief of counsel for the plaintiff in Pacific Insurance
Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall., 433.
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presented in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, with
its learned and exhaustive arguments and opinions, to give to the
country the eminently just decision that the personal income tax
is a direct tax.8 Instead of subjecting the Supreme Court to
criticism, this decision in the Pollock case must ever be taken as
the most assuring evidence that the Supreme Court of the United
States, though it may at times, unintentionally and in error, wan-
der from the safeguards of true constitutional construction, will
sooner or later return to the judicial truth and declare to the
American people what are the fundamental principles in our re-
publican government, which have preserved for one hundred and
twenty years the remarkable institutions in which every American
has so much pride.
It is very interesting to notice in this connection that George
Ticknor Curtis, who became one of our foremost American
jurists, writing in I866, many years prior even to the institution
of the Springer suit, declared that the personal income tax was
undoubtedly a direct tax and ought to be levied by apportion-
ment among the several States. He had the courage to suggest
that the personal income tax of the Civil War was unconstitu-
tional and the revenue therefrom illegally collected. In a. most
carefully prepared article" he reviewed the question of what were
direct taxes from the point of view of judicial construction ;10 of
congressional construction as judged from contemporaneous leg-
islation; of the intent of those who framed and ratified the Con-
stitution, and of a correct constitutional interpretation on the
principle of the thing itself. He came to the conclusion that
8 The Pollock case must be counted as one of the most remarkable
cases that has yet come before the Supreme Court in its history. Per-
haps no case was ever so exhaustively and elaborately argued. The-
briefs of the counsel were very voluminous and amounted almost to
treatises on the subject of taxation, dealing with it from its historical,
economic, constitutional and judicial aspects. Pertinent to our discussion
here, see particularly the brief of Mr. Clarence A. Seward against the
constitutionality of the tax, in which he covered certain features of our
political history never before fully understood. In this brief he received
the assistance of no less an authority than Prof.. Edwin R. A. Seligman,
one of the leading political economists of this country.
9 "Revenue Powers of the United States," in Harper's New Monthly
Magazine, Vol. XXXIII, 354 (Aug., 1866).
10 See Mr. Curtis' analysis of the decision in the carriage tax case
(3 Dallas, 171) and the distinction between direct and indirect taxes
explained there.
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there should be no question that the founders of our government,
in using the expression "direct taxes" meant to include the in-
come tax. In the same article, revealing great confidence in the
integrity and wisdom of our highest tribunal and with a judicial
foresight that amounted almost to prescience, he declared that
signs were not wanting to show that the time would come when
the supremacy of the Constitution would be reasserted and the
Supreme Court would rightfully adjudge as to the nature of the
income tax. After witnessing some adverse decisions, the learned
jurist, had he lived,"' would have waited thirty years before the
Supreme Court, in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Com-
pany, declared that a general income tax levied without appor-
tionment among the several States was unconstitutional and void.
RESTRAINTS IMPOSED UPON DIRECT TAXES BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.
We have now seen that, under the natural and logical signifi-
cance of the term, and by the understanding of those who both
framed and ratified the Constitution, a general income tax
falls within the expression "direct taxes," and this has been af-
firmed by the judicial declaration of the Supreme Court of the
United States. How does it come that this rule of apportionment
is in our Constituion? Has it a natural and rightful place there?
Is it a provision which deserves to be respected and now fol-
lowed?
It has been said that the provision regarding the apportionment
of direct taxes was inserted in the Constitution in the midst of
a heated debate as a compromise between the conflicting inter-
ests of the North and the South." This is a mistake. Of all the
provisions of the Constitution, whether in the nature of com-
"1 Mr. Curtis died only one year before the Pollock case was decided.
12 Judge Story seems to suggest this in his treatise on the Constitu-
tion. i Story, 705, sect. 936. But never until recent years has this theory
been seriously contended for. Prof. Chas. J. Bullock must be taken as
the leading exponent of this theory of the origin of the direct tax clause.
In. an article in the Political Science Quarterly he goes at great length
into the proceedings of the constitutional convention and elaborately
argues that the clause was a mere compromise between the North and
the South. Prof. Bullock's article, however, contains many inaccuracies
and his conclusions do not follow upon the facts even as he states them,
according to all correct principles of logic. "The Origin of the Direct
Tax Clause of the Federal Constitution," Political Sci. Quar., Vol. XV,
217, 452.
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promises to adjust the interests of different sections or States, or
whether in the nature of a solemn grant to the Union, there are
few which more deserve the sanction and respect of the American
people than the qualification of the direct taxing power.
Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, in his series of propositions
presented to the convention May 29, 1787, setting forth the
scheme of a national government proposed as his second resolu-
tion:
"Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national
legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of contribit-
tions or to the number of inhabitants." 13
Here, before the convention has been in session five days, is
the first appearance of the principle that representation and
taxation ought to bear some relation or fixed ratio to each other.
Mr. Patterson, of New Jersey, set forth the federal idea of gov-
ernment, and his resolutions, submitted to the convention, pro-
vided that the general government should not have the power of
laying direct taxes until it had first levied its requisitions among
the several States and they had failed to fulfill the same. It
would seem, therefore, that under either form of government,
national or federal, some positive restriction or qualification in
the exercise of the direct taxing power was deemed desirable by
both parties. At the same time it is significant to note that
Charles Pinckney submitted a plan of a constitution which he
himself had drawn up containing this provision:
"The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the
whole number of inhabitants of every description," etc.
On May 3oth the convention went into the committee of the
whole, and agreed to nineteen different propositions founded on
Mr. Randolph's resolutions, which were to be the basis of the
new government and which were reported on June I 9 th.'
4 These
propositions did not contain the resolution fixing the proportion
of direct taxes, which was for the time being postponed, but not
because of any opposition to the principle itself.
15 In the com-
'13 V Elliot's Debates, 126, 127, 128 and 129. Curtis' History of the
Constitution of the U. S., Vol. II, Ch. VI, 116-128.
14 V Elliot, 132.
15 It was objected to more on account of the ambiguity of expression
and the possible unwisdom. of fixing a restraint different from what had
obtained under the Articles of Confederation, and before the plan of the
new government had been definitely fixed. V Elliot, 134, 135. Curtis'
Const. Hist. of the U. S. (I889), Vol. I, 334, 335-
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mittee of the whole it had been agreed that the basis of representa-
tion in both branches of the legislature should be according to
population and the right of suffrage should be by numbers. But
this plan naturally displeased the advocates of the federal style
of government and the smaller States; and there then followed
one of the most heated struggles of the convention, and which
was not determined until July 2nd by the appointment of a com-
mittee of compromise 16 to which the entire question was re-
ferred.
This committee reported on July 5th the resolution which
formed the first- grand compromise of the convention.17 It was
that each State should have an equal vote in the second branch
in the legislature, i. e., the Senate; and as a concession to the
larger States, it proposed that all revenue measures should
originate in the popular branch of the legislature. The com-
mittee's report also contained the proposition that slaves should be
counted in the ratio of three-fifths to free inhabitants, which
subsequently became the basis of the grand compromise between
the free and the slave States.' 8 Gouverneur Morris contended that
property was as much the object of protection by society as life,
and that wealth ought to be represented in the national legisla-
ture. This view found support in a number" of the members
of the convention, among whom were Elbridge Gerry, Rufus
King, Gorham and Butler.1 Mr. Rutledge declared that the
suffrage of the several States ought to be regulated in proportion
to the sums paid to the general revenue by the inhabitants of the
several States.2" Here we find in the propositions of either
Morris or Rutledge, the same fundamental principle of American
government, whose justice, it seems, was never objected to by a
single member of that convention-that the power to impose taxes
ought not to be committed to a majority of mere members with
16 See particularly debates of June 25, 27-30, and July 2; V Elliot,
238, 239, 240, 249-273 inc. Curtis, Const. Hist., Vol. I, 338, 339, 342-
346 inc.
17 Curtis' Const. Hist., Vol. I, 406, 407. V. Elliot, 274.
Is V Elliot, 274-278 inc.; 280, 285, 298, 299. Curtis' Const. Hist. I,
409, 410.
19 V Elliot, 279, 280, 281, 291.
20 V Elliot, 279.
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no safeguards for its exercise,21 making possible the imposition
of burdens on a certain portion of the community to the ex-
clusion of the remainder. The discussion which took place
during these days in July in the convention shows that "those
patriotic men well knew that the unrestrained and unregulated
power of taxation had been,-in all the experience of the world,
the chief instrument of oppression and tyranny, and while the
power was indispensable to the existence of the nation, it was not
the less necessary that it should-be kept within definite bounds. 22
The question of basing representation on a combined estimate
of population and wealth was finally referred to a committee of
five, which reported substantially on July 9 th that the representa-
tion in the lower house should be distributed among the States
according to a compound ratio of wealth and numbers of inhabit-
ants. This proposition was, for the time being, adopted.
23 It
was at this juncture that the question of slavery first appeared
in any way to bear upon the question of the relation of representa-
tion to taxation, for it soon became manifest that representation
based on wealth had some very impracticable features and par-
ticularly opened a wide door to irregularity and fraud in the
counting of slaves, which might at one time be counted as
property and at another as persons. Some members, too, con-
tended that population itself was the best index of wealth.2 ' On
July ioth and Inth there occurred the most heated debate over
the question of representation of slaves, which was finally settled
by the adoption of the proposition that three-fifths of the slaves
should be counted as free white. Subsequent to this Mr. William-
son's resolution basing representation on wealth and population
was rejected. 25  This seems to have been the last thing that
occurred on July Inth, and the next day Gouverneur Morris came
forward immediately with his proposition that taxation shall be
21 That the institution of slavery certainly complicated the application
of the rule regulating taxation by representation, cannot be denied. But
that this principle did not have its origin in an attemit to make a compro-
mise between the North and the South, or was not adopted as a part of the
Constitution for that reason, is most apparent. See Curtis' Const. Hist. I,
415, 416. Read the Debates as reported by Elliot, V, pp. cited supra.
22 Former Senator George F. Edmunds in "Salutary Results of the
Income Tax Decision," The Forum (1895), Vol. XIX, 513, 516.
23 V Elliot, 288.
24 Especially Roger Sherman of Connecticut, V Elliot, 297.
2 5 Curtis' Const. Hist. I, 48.
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in proportion to representation. 26 This resolution, though put in
the reverse form by Mr. Wilson, was finally adopted by the
convention on July i 3 th, after a long debate, in the following
words: "Provided always that the representation ought to be
proportional to direct taxation.
27
From the debates and the discussions which took place in the
convention there is nothing to show that this was first suggested
as a compromise on the slave question. It was introduced on
July 12th, to take the place of the proposition that representation
be based on wealth as well as numbers, which itself had been
discarded as being too vague.S The only way in which the
institution of slavery affected this question was that the presence
of the slaves in the Southern States rendered more apparent the
difficulties and objections of basing representation on both wealth
and numbers. The crucial point of the compromise on the slave
question was the proposition that three-fifths of the slaves should
be counted as free inhabitants. 29 It was around that proposition
that all the heated discussions between the advocates of the
North and the South centered. Evidence seems conclusive that had
there been no dispute on the question of slavery and the South's
representation in the House, nevertheless the convention would
have adopted, in some form or another, a definite restriction on
the exercise of the direct taxing power. °
20 V Elliot, 302.
27 V Elliot, 305, 3o6.
28This is manifestly George Ticknor Curtis' view of the matter.
Curtis' Const. Hist. I, 412, 413.
29 Mr. Pinckney's defense in the South Carolina convention, of the
clause regulating the basis of representation in the House of Representa-
tives shows clearly that the gist of the compromise between the North
and the South was the provision relating to the manner of counting
slaves as three-fifths of free inhabitants. V Elliot.
30 Very few constitutional writers of this country have gone into a
careful historical analysis of the compromises of the constitutional con-
vention and of the provisions of the instrument itself. George Ticknor
Curtis must be taken as one of the greatest authorities in this country on
this subject. See Curtis' Hist. of the Const. of U. S. (1858, 2 Vols.).
See also his Const. Hist. of U. S. (N. Y., 1889, 2 Vols.). A review of his
works will show that he sustains the views expressed above. I do not
know of a single writer who, after having made a careful analysis of
the proceedings of the constitutional convention, holds to the theory that
the qualification of the direct taxing power was inserted as a mere
compromise between the North and the South.
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In the report of the committee of detail on August 6th the
clause in question was submitted in not very different words.
Subsequently when the Constitution was finally drafted by the
committee of revision in September, the rule concerning direct
taxes was placed in the article prescribing the basis of representa-
tion, where it naturally belonged, and was made to read as
follows:
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included in this Union, according
to their respective numbers," etc.
In this form it passed the convention and has since remained
a part of the organic law of our government.
The qualification of direct taxes is the only provision in the en-
tire Constitution which appears twice in that instrument. This
fact ought to teach us to hold it in still higher regard and to
respect the more the earnestness and intent of the framers who
placed it there. The second place in which it appears in the
instrument is in Section 9, where it appears as a positive restric-
tion upon the legislative powers of Congress in the words quoted
on the first page of this article.
3 ' The committee of detail on
August 6th reported the positive restriction that "no capitation
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census," etc. But on
September i4th, when the convention was going over the Con-
stitution for the last time, Mr. Read, of Delaware, moved to insert
after the word "capitation" the words "or other direct tax," and
it was immediately agreed to.
32
THE INCOME TAX UNDER AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS.
When we come to follow the new Constitution out of the Phila-
delphia convention, and before the people and into the conventions
of the several States, the evidence as to the origin and intent of
the direct tax clause becomes all the more clear and convincing.
31 The appearance of this restriction on the exercise of the direct
taxing power for a second time in the Constitution and among the express
prohibitions imposed upon Congress, is the most convincing proof of
the intent of the framers, and that they did not regard it as forming a
mere compromise between the North and the South. Prof. Bullock in
his article in the Political Science Quarterly seems to admit that the
second inclusion of this clause in the Constitution is at variance with
his theory of a compromise, for he says, "It seems strange that such a
clause should have been deemed necessary."
32 Elliot, V, 379, 545.
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It was interpreted by the people as a limitation upon Congress
in the exercise of the direct taxing power, to protect them and
their property from discrimination and oppression; and by the
States it was accepted as a safeguard to their sovereignty and
existence. Even such ardent Nationalists as Hamilton and Madi-
son, who did not approve of this provision when it first came up
in the constitutional convention, were only too glad to defend
the rule of apportionment as an express limitation guarding and
confining the imposition of direct taxes.
Thus we find Mr. Hamilton writing in the Federalist in 1788,
prior to the New York convention, and commending the rule as
follows :83
"Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not
to be left to the discretion of the national legislature: an actual
census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule; a
circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or op-
pression. The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been
provided against with guarded circumspection."
In the Massachusetts convention we find Rufus King, at the
very outset, declaring that "It is a principle of this Constitution
that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. And
it was adopted because it was the language of all America."! '
Can any words be plainer? Is there anything here savoring of
a sectional or temporary compromise?
Patrick Henry, the old Revolutionary patriot and orator, de-
clared with earnestness in the Virginia convention: "I will not
give up the power of direct taxation but for a scourge." 3" We are
not used to such impassioned oratory in these days, but it was not
uncommon then, and let no reader belittle the popularity and
strength of the views of Patrick Henry. He was a sincere
patriot and had behind him all but a majority of that Virginia
convention ready to vote down the proposed Constitution. While
ninety millions of people must now rejoice that Mr. Henry's
position did not prevail, let no one of them mistake that were
it not for the qualification restricting the exercise of the direct
taxing power, the Constitution would never have been ratified by
Virginia, New York, New Hampshire,3 8 South Carolina, Massa-
83 The Federalist (Lippincott, Philadelphia, i888), No. XXXVI, p. 276.
34 II Elliot's Debates, 36.
35 III Elliot's Debates, 56.
38 The New Hampshire convention, in session the latter part of May,
had to be adjourned for nearly one month, till June, 1788, in order to
prevent a defeat for the Constitution.
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chusetts, and perhaps Maryland, and the United States of Amer-
ica would never have been a nation. Instead then of being a
mere compromise, fitted to bridge a sectional disagreement, it
was a permanent, solemn compact, which perhaps alone made
this nation a reality.
3 7
The six States named above, together with North Carolina, all
adopted a set of amendments which were submitted to the Con-
gress with the prayer that they should be made a part of the
Constitution.8 Among these amendments was one which declared
in substance that the Congress shall not lay direct taxes, but when
the money arising from the impost and excise shall be insuffi-
cient for the public exigencies, nor even then until Congress
shall have first made a requisition upon the States, etc.
39 This
was subscribed to by each one of the seven States which we
have named, forming a clear majority of the thirteen colonies.
Such was the temper and feeling of the people then, and does
anyone really suppose, in the face of these events, that, had the
Constitution conceded to the general government an absolute and
unlimited power to impose direct taxes, it would ever have been
adopted ?
It is argued that the framers intended to give this nation
unlimited powers of taxation similar to those enjoyed by other
sovereign governments. To assert this is to fail to comprehend
the genius of American institutions. There is not a word in
any of the pages of Elliot's Debates which gives countenance to
the idea that the founders either thought they were giving, or
intended to give, unlimited powers of taxation to the new nation.
This feature is well summed up in Mr. Justice Field's con-
curring opinion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
where he says:
"There is no such. thing in the theory of our national govern-
ment as unlimited power of taxation in Congress. There are
limitations of its powers arising out of the essential nature of all
37There is a story that George Washington, when he was about to
sign the Constitution, said these words: "Should the States reject this
excellent Constitution, the probability is that an opportunity will never
again offer to cancel another in peace-the next will be drawn in blood."
See Curtis' History of the Constitution (I858), Vol. II, 487, note.
38 These propositions became the basis of the first ten amendments,
which were adopted in 1791, and form for us a national bill of rights.
39This amendment was not adopted by Congress, and fortunately,
too. It would scarcely have been proper to take away the direct taxing
power entirely from the general government, perhaps placing the latter
at the mercy of the States in the matter of requisitions.
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free governments. There are reservations and individual rights,
without which society could not exist, and which are respected by
every government. The right of taxation is subject to these
limitations." 40
Let us compare also Mr. Justice Miller's celebrated words in
Loan Association v. Topeka." "I
"It must be conceded that there are rights in every free gov-
ernment beyond the control of the State. A government which
recognized no such rights, which held the lives, liberty and
property of its citizens, subject at all times to the disposition and
unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of
power, is after all a despotism. It is true that it is a despotism
of the many-of the majority, if you chose to call it so-but it
is none the less a despotism."
It was in part to give expression to these basic principles of
civilized government, to protect these fundamental rights of per-
sons and property, that the rule of apportionment was inserted in
the Constitution. How futile and improper, therefore, is it to argue,
that, because other nations impose the income tax, we can do
the same. We should carefully consider the conditions which
obtain in this country before we conclude, on mere economic
theories alone, as the political economists do, that the United
States can adopt the income tax.
This country has an area of over three and one-half millions
of square miles. Its population is very unequally distributed;
its resources and industries are greatly diversified; the standards
of living and conditions of wealth of its people are very different
and unequal in different sections of the country,4
2 and at the same
time, all the more intimate and personal functions of government
are reserved to, and exercised by, its forty-eight sovereign
States. 43  Under such circumstances to reason, therefore, that
the central government can impose direct taxes with no restraints
whatever is to disregard utterly our political institutions, and our
40 157 U. S., 429, 599. Compare Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion in
Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S., 616, 63o and 631.
41 20 Wall., 655, 665.
42 The vast difference in the areas of the territory covered by the
government of the United States, and those of European nations, will at
once illustrate how impossible are comparisons between the two. For
instance, Austria, the largest country territorially, which imposes a
national income tax, is but one-fifteenth the size of the United States.
42 No countries in Europe which have anything approaching a federal
form of government impose a national income tax. In Switzerland, the
income tax is imposed by the separate Cantons, not by the general govern-
ment In the German Empire, Prussia and other principalities employ an
income tax, but not the imperial government.
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tdrritorial and financial conditions. Now, it will be seen that the
income tax being classed as a direct tax, it follows that it can-
not fall within the rule of uniformity, which applies only to im-
posts, duties and excises, while the proposed amendment with-
draws it from the rule of apportionment. The income tax will
be, therefore, the only kind of imposition known to our Constitu-
tion, which can be levied without any restraints whatever. A
graduated and progressive income tax, discriminating even to the
utmost degree, will be possible under our Constitution, as it shall
stand afte r the adoption of the proposed amendment." The
limit of its exemption can be so artfully framed and the rate of
its assessment made so high as to fall exclusively on certain
States or sections of the country, or on certain persons, to the
exclusion of others, and to the exclusion of the very States and
persons through whose votes in Congress perhaps the tax has
been imposed.
In times when political feelings and prejudices run high, it
will be an instrument of power in the hands of a majority almost
certain to be abused. In this country the unbounded power to
impose any form of income taxes would give opportunity for
free play to all sectional prejudices and open a wide door to in-
vidious class legislation. No authority granted to our govern-
ment in respect to taxation carries with it such serious dangers of
flagrant wrong and injustice, even of oppression, as the unre-
strained exercise of the income taxing power.
The rule of apportionment as prescribed in the Constitution
to-day has been very severely criticised by some of our jurists
and political economists, and the provision has been condemned
as having no rightful place in the code of our organic law.
Prominent among those who take this position are Professor
Charles J. Bullock and Justices White and Harlan, of the Su-
preme Court.45 Notwithstanding some of the vehement denuncia-
44 I am of the opinion that the principle of equality in taxation, and
perhaps also the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws,
would forbid Congress imposing an income tax within certain States and
none whatever in other States. But exactly the same disastrous results
may be accomplished by means of a graded and progressive income tax.
4 Mr. Justice White in his dissenting opinion in the Pollock case
condemns the rule of apportionment according to population as the "most
flagrantly unjust, unequal and wrongful system of taxation known to any
civilized government." Pollock v. Farmers' Loan& Trust Co., 158 U. S.,
565. The words of the learned Justice are altogether 
immoderate
and are not borne out in any way by the facts. As we shall see later,
his narrow definition of direct taxes is without justice or common sense.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions, it is perfectly true that at the time this qualification was
adopted the rule of apportionment, according to population, was
as equitable and fair a rule as could have been devised. At the
time of the constitutional convention the population of each
State was a fair measure of its wealth. Even to-day the
better opinion among students of our political institutions is that,
while population is no longer an exact index of a State's wealth,
an income tax levied under ihe present rule of apportionment
would operate with far greater justice and equity, taking the
country as a whole, than one imposed with no qualifications or re-
straints. Thus, the group of States corresponding to the thirteen
original colonies having to-day thirty-eight per cent of the total
population of the country, therefore bearing 38% of the direct
taxes of the government, hold 40% of the country's wealth. This
would not be a disproportionate contribution to the burden of the
general government.
The writer, however, does not wish to be understood as neces-
sarily defending the rule of apportionment according to popula-
tion as the only, and most just, method of restriction. Per-
haps there should be some other method devised for re-
straining the general government in its exercise of the direct
taxing power. If economic conditions have so changed as to
render the operation of the rule inequitable to-day, any amend-
ment of the Constitution ought to be so made as to apply to direct
taxes generally. But that is not what the advocates of this
amendment propose. They have no intention of modifying the
constitutional rule qualifying the exercise of the direct taxing
power as a whole and which they so strongly denounce. Rather
would they create a new power-the absolute and unlimited au-
thority to tax incomes from whatever source derived, regardless
of any restraint whatever, not even the rule of uniformity, a
power which we have shown to be unfitted to our scheme of
government.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution experience
had shown that of all forms of direct taxes, that against
real estate was the one which operated with greatest injustice.
It had been proved in the days of the Confederation that tax
requisitons apportioned among the States on their real property
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were the most inefficient and most inequitable impositions. Here,
it seems to the writer, is the serious weakness in the dissenting
opinions of the minority justices in the Pollock case. Their
construction of the direct tax clause would leave but two forms
of taxation subject to its operation-the tax on land and capitation
taxes; and of all direct taxes none is so "flagrantly unjust, unequal
and wrongful" (to use Mr. Justice White's language) as the
apportioned tax on real estate.
48 At the same time it is well
known that probably not a single member of the Constitutional
Convention ever entertained the idea that the federal govern-
ment which they were forming would ever impose a capitation
tax apportioned among the States. Even Mr. Hamilton, who
was in favor of giving the broadest powers to the general gov-
ernment, expresses himself as strongly opposed to a capitation
tax so far as the general government is concerned.
4 If we
were to adopt the interpretation of the direct tax clause to corre-
spond with the minority opinion in the Pollock case, it would be
to impute to those wise statesmen such a want of a sense of jus-
tice, and such a political short-sightedness as would be shocking.
Much better had they inserted in the Constitution an absolute
prohibition against the imposition of direct taxes, and this they
would' have done, had their definition corresponded with that,
of some of our jurists and political economists to-day. But since
everything goes to show that the framers expected that the gov-
ernment might be obliged to resort to some form of direct tax in
times of national exigency, it is quite conclusive that they in-
terpreted the term "direct taxes" in a much broader way than has
been recently contended for. Similarly also to do away
with the alleged injustice of this clause by withdrawing from
46 In the debate on the adoption of the Constitution in the Virginia
convention, delegates, while objecting to the unqualified exercise of the
direct taxing power, criticised the clause in question as being unjust.
Madison then defended the constitutional provision on the ground that
other objects than real estate were to be included in the term "direct
taxes," and that the government could exercise some discretion as to the
property on which a direct tax would be imposed. III Elliot's Debates,
pp. 254, 255.
47 Hamilton said: "As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my
disapprobation of them; I should lament to see them introduced into
practice under the national government. But does it follow, because
there is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid?" The Fed-
eralist, No. XXXVI. See also II Elliot, 43, 105, xo6, 135, 340, 391 and 502.
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its operation the only form of tax that can be apportioned with
a fair degree of equity among the States, and to leave within its
purview those forms of direct taxes to which the federal govern-
ment will never resort, seems really absurd, and not in keeping
with the dignity of our Constitution.
THE QUESTION OF NECESSITY AND PAST EXPERIENCE.
It is claimed that the general government should be given un-
doubted power to impose an income tax, regardless of the rule of
apportionment, in order that it may be in a position to provide for
unseen national exigencies. Any intention of exercising such a
power at present is disclaimed, but it may become necessary in
some future crisis, so its advocates say. This attempt to amend
our Constitution to provide for future necessities as if our fore-
fathers had never known such exigencies and had not made sub-
stantial provision for them, would seem to show either great
ignorance or presumption.
It was a national exigency which gave birth to the Constitution
as we have it to-day. For eight years not long prior to the as-
sembling of the constitutional convention the Congress of the
Confederation had been attempting to wage a long and serious
war without money, without resources and without power to
levy or collect taxes. Briefly, this was the crisis through which
those statesmen had passed, and it is probable that in adopting the
provisions of the Constitution relating to the taxing powers of
the government, their own experience held before their minds the
necessity of providing for national exigencies, in a clearer vet
more serious aspect than we can view it now. The resources of
the country are richer and more varied than ever before, and we
are surrounded with an unparalleled internal commerce and our
opportunities for industrial activity, even though war might tem-
porarily suspend our foreign trade, are unequal. The whole range
of excise taxes on all the varied business activities of this won-
derful country lie within the power of the general government
and our resources for a national revenue are more extensive and
reliable than ever before.48 In the face of these considerations, is
it not presumptuous for us, on the plea of providing for the
future, thus light-heartedly and hastily to amend the Constitution
48 See Former-Senator George F. Edmunds' article in The Forum
(1895), Vol. XIX, 513, 517, entitled "Salutary Results of the Income Tax
Decision."
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which the nation's founders had drawn up after having survived
a financial exigency which it is difficult for us to appreciate?
This country has now had a national existence of one hun-
dred and twenty years. It has endured through peace and war,
has confronted many financial crises and internal disturbances,
and yet with but one exception, the income tax has never formed
an important part of our fiscal policy; and never has it proved
to be a vital or really necessary source of national revenue. The
exigencies presented at the outbreak of the Civil War were of a
different character. The country had just passed through a re-
markable period of material prosperity; from 1838 until practi-
cally the time when the war broke out, trade and industry were
at a high-water mark. The great majority of the people of the
country were highly prosperous and wealth was very equitably
distributed. During this period the revenue of the government,
which was more than ample, was practically derived from duties
on imports. From the material point of view this condition of
affairs placed the government in a rather favorable position, but
in other respects circumstances had brought about a state of
mind in which the government had given little thought to the
problem of raising extraordinary revenues for a national crisis,
and extreme measures had to be resorted to.
It was under these circumstances that the Secretary of the
Treasury, Mr. Chase, apologetically suggested an income tax, but
scarcely recommended it.' Congress approached the subject with
hesitation and it was not until July, 1862, that the first income tax
became a law,5" while the government did not begin to receive
4 In his annual report to Congress, 1861, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury said: "The Secretary is acquainted with no statistics which afford the
means of a satisfactory estimate of the amount likely to be realized from
the income tax. Considering, however, how large a proportion of income
after the deductions sanctioned by law will fall within the exemption
limit of $8oo a year, and considering also what numerous questions will
certainly perplex its assessment and collection, he respectfully submits
whether the probable revenue affords a sufficient reason for putting in
operation, at great cost, the machinery of the act, with a view, should
the States assume the direct tax, to the collection of the income tax
alone."
5o As a matter of fact, the revenue measure of 186i contained a tax
of 3% on all incomes over $8oo, but the government .refrained from
levying this tax or enforcing the law. Even in that crisis, Secretary of
the Treasury Chase was reluctant to enforce what seemed so
radical a form of taxation.
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any revenue therefrom until nearly the middle of 1863, when
the war itself was half over. This brief reference to its enact-
ment will show us that as an emergency measure the importance
of the tax has been greatly exaggerated.
The law of 1862 provided for an imposition of 3% on all
incomes between $6oo and $io,ooo and 5% on all incomes over
$Io,ooo. The measure of I865 was made more severe, being
5% on all incomes of $6oo and over, io% on $io,ooo and over.
Then, too, in addition to the regular revenue measures by an act
passed July 4, 1864, Congress imposed a special income tax of
5% on all incomes over $600 earned or accrued for the year 1863.
As a measure to respond immediately to the financial exigen-
cies of the country or to save a nation's credit, the income tax
amounted to little or nothing. Estimating the total cost of the
war, which was over by the close of the fiscal year 1865, at
$2,500,000,000, the income tax from all sources and under laws
passed during the war itself yielded only a little over $86,oOoOOO,
including the special income tax passed in 1864, but not collected
until 1865. This is only 3% of the financial burden of that great
struggle. The collection of an income tax had to remain in
force for more than eight years after peace was concluded
to bring the yield up to even as much as one-ninth of the cost.
While the income tax furnished in actual figures a substantial
sum, it is scarcely accurate to speak of it as having provided a
great part of the means for carrying on the Civil War.
In three of the years during Lhe income tax period the yield
was substantial, though at n'o time did it bear a really large pro-
portion to the total revenue. Thus, in 1864, the first full year in
which the general tax on personal incomes was collected, the re-
ceipts from that source alone amounted to but $14,933,362, while
the total receipts from the internal revenue amounted to $117,-
145,748, the income tax collections being a little more than one-
tenth of the revenue; meanwhile, the expenses of the govern-
ment were running at the rate of something like $6o,oooooo a
month, or considerably over $7ooooo,ooo a year. It will be seen
that in that year the income tax returned only about one-fiftieth
of the total fiscal obligations of the government. In 1866, with
the rate at 5% on all incomes over $600 and io% on $io,ooo, the
direct income tax returned about sixty-eight millions, while the
total receipts from internal revenue were $31o,ooo,ooo, of which
the income tax yielded 22%. That year marked the tax's culmina-
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tion, for the necessity for such extraordinary revenue being re-
moved, the people were no longer so conscientious in making a
return of their taxable incomes and from that time the receipts
from this source fell off, at first gradually and then rapidly, until
finally in 1872 but a little over eight millions of dollars were re-
ceived from the income tax out of a total internal revenue of
$132,ooo,ooo, a little more than one-twentieth.
In judging of the efficacy of this tax regard must be had to
the very low exemption limit and the very high rate of taxation
which prevailed throughout a great part of that period; while
patriotism and the war spirit played a great part in furthering
honesty in the return of taxable incomes and in the collection
of the tax itself. The material condition of our people and the
fact that many incomes derived from business pursuits were
very largely increased, due to the high price which the necessaries
of life and all commodities commanded during the war
period, should have largely augmented the returns from this
source of revenue. In brief, then, the Civil War period presented
extremely favorable circumstances for a successful collection of
an income tax, and it is very doubtful whether this country, even
in event of the crisis of another war, can again find such a com-
bination of circumstances as will assure even the limited suc-
cess which we experienced then."'
Manifestly, therefore, it is quite misleading to refer to the
success and efficiency of the income tax in such exaggerated terms
as used by the advocates of the proposed amendment. To speak
of the income tax as an important feature of the internal revenue
measures of that particular period is proper, but to speak of it as
having "once been vital to the preservation of national existence"
is very wide of the truth.5" The revenue resources of the federal
5' Mr. Joseph A. Hill says: "But it is certain that better results were
secured from the tax, and with less complaint and opposition than would
be possible in ordinary times. It would have been strange, indeed, if the
patriotism which led men to volunteer for the field in such numbers had
been inoperative when contributions of money were called for." In "The
Civil War Income Tax," Quar. Jour. of Econ., Vol. VIII, pp. 416, 451.
52 See Senator Root's open letter to Hon. F. M. Davenport, member
of the New York State Senate, published in the Congressional Record,
March 1, 1910, Vol. 45, P. 2564. It is doubtful whether the able Senator
from New York is as ignorant of the facts as he would lead us to believe,
and his remarks must rather be regarded as a fine specimen of fervid
oratory.
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government and subsequent history have since proved that the
income tax of the Civil War, while it was allowed to play an im-
portant part, was neither vital nor necessary to national existence.
On the whole, then, we must conclude that there is really no finan-
cial necessity to warrant this amendment to the United States
Constitution, and to refer to its rejection as amounting to "a
national calamity" appears to us as culpably misleading.53
DIRECT TAXES BY APPORTIONMENT AND THE INCOME TAX COM-
PARED.
Furthermore, it is probable that an income tax imposed by the
general government, after the adoption of the proposed amend-
ment, without regard to any census or enumeration will prove no
more efficient or satisfactory as a revenue measure than one
levied under the present rule of apportionment. It is believed
that experience will show that the rule of apportionment in no
way militates against the collection of the tax. In either case
the assessment is made against the citizen individually, and the
government is at liberty to resort to the same means or processes
in collecting the tax whether first levied with or without regard
to the rule of apportionment, the only difference being that under
the rule of apportionment the quota which it is proposed to col-
lect from each State is first estimated, and to meet this quota
the tax is collected from the incomes of the citizens.
The government has never imposed an income tax under the
rule of apportionment as now provided by the Constitution. It is,
therefore, difficult to judge how satisfactory or effective such
a revenue measure would be. What has been said above in this
article and the examples which I have given are enough to show
that in all probability an income tax levied by apportionment
among the several States would yield as large a revenue and be
even more equitable in its incidence than the imposition of an
unapportioned tax. The comparison between an apportioned in-
come tax and the old direct taxes, to which the government has
resorted five times in its history, furnishes a very poor basis by
which to judge results. The old direct tax as illustrated by the
revenue measures of 1798, 1813, 1814 and i816 was imposed
upon "lands, houses and slaves." The provisions in regard to its
collection were most awkward and the form of this tax, laid upon
53 See message of Governor Fort to the New Jersey Legislature of
February 7, i9io.
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real property, was one which, in respect of the objects of its im-
position, had proved in the old days of the Confederacy to be im-
practicable and unjust and had been afterwards abandoned. The
government experienced very indifferent success in the collection
of this tax. The direct tax of 1861 followed in a general way
all previous measures of the same nature and the amount which
the government set out to obtain from this source was strangely
enough put at the very low figure of $2o,oooooo. The peculiar
circumstances of the Civil War period and the insurrection of
eleven of the Southern States, against each of which was assessed
its proper proportion, gave rise to extraordinary difficulties and
inequalities; and the direct tax of 1861 proved even more un-
satisfactory than previous measures of its kind. In fact, it
is quite commonly said that the direct tax as illustrated by the
revenue measure of 1861 has been completely discredited, but as
we have above shown, this was not due to the rule of apportion-
ment so much as it was to that particular tax, the objects of the
imposition,14 the indifference on the part of the government to
this method of raising revenue and the extraordinary circum-
stances which then prevailed. Even under these conditions- Prof.
Charles F. Dunbar, himself a severe critic of the old direct tax,
writing in 1888, says:
"The default in its collection being a default less than one-
seventh of the total amount called for, it is probable that this tax
has been more completely collected than most of those laid during
the war. For example, it has probably been collected more
thoroughly than the income tax, the foundation of which was laid
by the same act which established the direct tax." 
"1
In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Louisiana 56 is very interesting. This decision placed
the unpaid quotas of the direct tax of 1861, so far as the processes
of its collection are concerned, in precisely the same position as
54 It is noticeable that when the revenue measure was under debate
in 1861, Congress objected to the direct tax, not because it was to be
imposed under the rule of apportionment, but because it fell upon the
owners of real estate only, to the exclusion of all other property holders,
particularly share holders and bond holders of corporations. See debates
of the 39th Congress in the Congressional Globe, July, i861. 
This objec-
tion, and a serious one it is, could not be made against an income tax
inmposed under the rule of apportionment.
55 See article, "The Direct Tax of i86I," by Chas. F. Dunbar, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. III. pp 436, 452.
56 123 U. S., 32.
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any other tax, including an income tax, assessed upon individuals
and which the government would be unable to collect in full.
Professor Dunbar says of the direct tax:
"It is difficult, for example, to distinguish it in any essential
particular from the case of unpaid income taxes laid during the
war and collected by severe process through the loyal States, but
neither then nor at any other time collected in the insurrectionary
States."
FEDERAL TAXATION OF STATE SECURITIES.
Among the serious questions which have been brought out
through the proposal to give to the general government power to
tax incomes, from whatever source derived without regard to any
apportionment, is the question whether this amendment will give
to Congress the right to impose a tax on incomes derived from
State or municipal securities. Governor Hughes, of New York,
with very good reason, is of the opinion that such a rule
would make taxation of State and municipal securities possible,
and, therefore, perhaps paralyze the proper instrumentalities of
State government. Senator Root, of New York, in an open
letter to a member of the New York State Senate plausibly argues
from exactly the opposite side.
Briefly, the situation seems to be somewhat like this: Under the
Constitution as it stands to-day the general government has
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. Of
this enumeration, the last three are subject to the rule of uni-
formity, while the word "taxes" refers to direct taxes alone,
which are subject to the rule of apportionment. In general, the
taxing clauses of the Constitution give the federal government
power to tax any and all kinds of property or business, and all
persons within its jurisdiction; at the same time there is no
pirticular species or form of property over which the taxing
power of the general government extends any more exclusively
than over any other class. It is a general taking power which is
hereby given to the government commensurate with its own needs
and with the nature of its institutions, and, like any other author-
ity found anywhere in the Constitution, is subject, of course, to
the implied limitations which are to be drawn from that Consti-
tution, and which must necessarily inhere as the instrument stands
to-day. The Constitution of the United States presupposes two
governments existing side by side, one of the individual States
and the other of the United States, each of which has its own
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field of jurisdiction and powers of taxation, and, in its own appro-
priate sphere, is supreme.
It is as true in respect of taxation as it is in other respects,
that the government of the United States is now manifestly and
intentionally one, not alone of enumerated powers, but of limited
powers. It has been erroneously said many times that the taxing
power of the government is unlimited, extending to every prop-
erty, business and person within its jurisdiction, knowing no
limitation whatever save the rule of uniformity and that of
apportionment, and that these refer, not to the extent of the
power itself, but simply to the manner of exercising that power.
This is, of course, a contradiction. While the taxing power of
the federal government extends to all persons, property and busi-
ness within its jurisdiction, and to that extent is plenary and
complete, even then it is not an unlimited power and was not
intended to be such. A qualification effecting the manner of the
exercise of a power is necessarily a qualification and limitation
of the power itself.
Right here, it seems to the writer, is the error which so
many of the advocates of the proposed amendment make. They
assert that the taxing power of the federal government is abso-
lute and unfettered, overlooking at the same time that its powers
in this particular are not absolute, but are qualified in a most
marked and intentional manner by these rules of uniformity and
apportionment. In their elaborate arguments to defend their
position they fail to notice that the very passages, which they
quote from the decisions of the Supreme Court, defining the
federal taxing power, are all careful to make specific mention of
its actual and implied qualifications.5 7 We are asked to point out
the particular provisions of the Constitution which to-day forbid
the taxation of State instrumentalities; but it is not in a particu-
lar provision that we are to find this inhibition, but by implica-
tion it was read into the Constitution by the Supreme Court. Mr.
justice Nelson, of that Court, in Collector v. Day,
58 said: "The
exemption rests upon necessary implication." The field of taxa-
tion open to the federal government being a general one and not
5 See speech of Senator Borah of Idaho in U. S. Senate, February
14, i1go, Congressional Record, Vol. XLV, p. 1843. But see Mr. Justice
Field's language in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S.,
429, 599; Mr. justice Miller in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655.
The License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 462, 471.
58-i, Wall., 13, 127.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
granted in absolute terms, it necessarily follows that it is quali-
fied by the nature of the instrument itself; and unless there is a
specific provision permitting the general government to tax a
particular species or form of property so as to include the securi-
ties of the States, we must assume that the States in creating the
Union never intended that their own instrumentalities should be
burdened or taxed.59
But, of course, the genius of the Constitution is such that the
States may grant to the general government such powers as
they please, through the proper channels; and right here under
the proposed amendment we meet a clause of very different im-
port. In the form of a grant from the States or the people,
this amendment concedes to the general government absolute
power to tax a certain form of property. Moreover, it is the
only clause in the entire instrument which specifically enumerates
a particular form of property, and gives to the general govern-
ment unlimited power of direct taxation over that property. In
the instrument as it is to-day the right to tax incomes is included
merely in the general taxing clause, and is possessed by the gov-
ernment only in common with the right to tax every other form
of property, and subject to all the expressed and implied qualifica-
tions inherent in the Constitution. But in the proposed amend-
ment is an authority conceded in terms so broad and sweeping as
are found nowhere else in the instrument, leading us to suppose
ro The following illustration may bring out one point at issue. Let
us suppose that the general taxing clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, instead of reading as it does to-day, read as follows: "The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises upon
every form and kind of property whatever and wherever situated." Is
there any difference in meaning between such a clause and the one which
we have now? Under such a grant would the federal government have
the power to tax the. instrumentalities of the States? I apprehend that
there is a very marked difference. Under such a constitutional grant I
cannot see how the Supreme Court would have been warranted in reading
into the Constitution the implied exemption in favor of State instru-
-mentalities as it did in Collector v. Day. This is virtualiy the hypo-
thetical question which Senator Borah of Idaho put in his argument in
favor of the proposed amendment at the New York Economic Club debate,
March 24, 19io. If the English language is to have any meaning at all,
I am of the opinion that the Senator's question must be answered in the
affirmative, for there is a decided difference between the clause as it stands
now and as it would read under the Senator's hypothesis.
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that any implied exemptions are overruled by the express lan-
guage in which it is granted. It says:
"Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on in-
comes from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, or without regard to any census or
enumeration."
Manifestly, therefore, under this clause taken by itself, the
federal government can tax any species of income from any
source whatever, including income from all State and municipal
bonds and securities, and freed, too, of the rule of uniformity,
the power may be exercised in an almost arbitrary manner. The
mere fact that the State securities themselves cannot be taxed
by the general government will not save us, for this provision
separates "income" from the property which produces it. "In-
come" is put in a class by itself. Just as the rentals from houses
and lands will no longer follow real property, and the income from
personal estates will no longer follow personal property, here also
the income derived from State and municipal bonds is no longer
subject to the rules which effect the taxation of such bonds. Prior
to the income tax decision in the Pollock case and in the absence
of definite adjudication, there was not the same unanimity as to
the exemption from taxation of income derived from State secur-
ities, as there was respecting the exemption from taxation of such
securities themselves. There is, therefore, a strong probability
that under this new article no exemption would be allowed in
favor of the income derived from State securities simply because
such securities themselves would be exempt from tax imposi-
tions.60 It is a fair presumption from the terms of this grant
that this amendment is intended to give to the federal government
a taxing power co-extensive with the language used, and corre-
sponding to the unqualified and sweeping nature of its provisions,
60 But the better judicial opinion was inclined to the rule that the
implied exemption in favor of State instrumentalities, eo nomine, from
federal taxation, carried with it a like exemption of income derived from
such instrumentalities. But no less an authority than Mr. Justice Bradley
dissented from the opinion of the Court in Collector v. Day, ii Wall.,
113, 128; and in Weston v. City of Charlestolt, 2 Peters, 449, 470 and 473.
Justices Johnson and Thompson dissented on this express point, that,
while there was an implied exemption from State taxation in favor of
United States government bonds, the same exemption did not extend to
income derived from such bonds, and the tax imposed in that case was in
their judgment an income tax. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316;
Dobbins v. Erie County, Y6 Peters, 435.
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and that, in respect of its authority to tax incomes at least, the
federal government is not to be restrained by those implied limita-
tions which qualify the exercise of all other po w'ers granted to it.
It would seem as if the Supreme Court in construing the
United States Constituion as it shall be after the adoption of
the proposed amendment, will find itself in the midst of incon-
sistent and contradictory provisions which cannot be construed
in harmony with each other. It will be presented with contra-
dictory alternatives, one of which it will have to adopt. Fortu-
nate, indeed, will be this country if the Supreme Court, under
these circumstances, shall boldly override the unqualified language
of the proposed amendment and exclude from its operations an
income tax levied on the' instrumentalities of the States. Yet to
do this will be a violent stretch of its judicial authority. But
what are we to say of an instrument whose provisions and
grants are so inharmonious and inconsistent that the Supreme
Court cannot construe one part thereof without contradicting
and doing violence to the other, nor can it uphold the other
without boldly overriding and nullifying the first?
Constitutional, indeed, the imposition of an income tax will be,
yet, nevertheless, this amendment is inherently improper under
the limitations which ought to guard the concessions of authority
to our federal government. In that matchless code, called by
one of England's greatest statesmen "the most wonderful work
ever struck off at a given time by the brain of man," this amend-
ment will be an anomaly. In an otherwise harmonious instrument
which speaks of a government of enumerated powers, seeking to
preserve the dignity and vitality of sovereign States, this provi-
sion will stand out as the one discordant note, inconsistent with all
that has gone before, unexplained, uncalled for, unnecessary,
the only grant to the federal government of unrestrained and
arbitrary power in respect of taxation over every State and every
citizen within those States.
New Haven, Conn. Arthur C. Graves.
